PUBLICATIONS

Ronald N. Giere


BOOKS:
  • Foundations of Scientific Method: The Nineteenth Century. Edited with Richard S. Westfall. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973, 306 pp.
  • Understanding Scientific Reasoning. New York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1979, 371 pp. (2nd ed., 1984; 3rd ed., 1991; 4th ed., 1997). Second edition translated into Dutch as: Vat op Wetenschap: Een Inleiding in Wetenschappelijk Denken. Trans. P. Sloep, H. Reddingius, and B. Voorzanger. Amsterdam: Wolters-Noordhoff, 1990, 366 pp.
  • 1980, Vol. 1. Edited with P. D. Asquith. Proceedings of the 1980 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (Contributed Papers). East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1980, 370 pp.
  • 1980, Vol. 2. Edited with P. D. Asquith. Proceedings of the 1980 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association (Symposia). East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1981, 696 pp.
  • Explaining Science: A Cognitive Approach. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988, 313 pp. Translated into Spanish as: La Explicación de la Ciencia: Un Acercamiento Cognoscitivo. Lomas Altas, Mexico: Consejo Nacional de Ciencia Y Tecnología, 1992, 354 pp. Translated into Italian as:Spiegare la Scienza: Un Approccio Cognitivista. Bologna: Il Mulino, 1996, 469 pp.
  • Cognitive Models of Science. Editor. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XV. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992, 508 pp.
  • Origins of Logical Empiricism. Edited with A. W. Richardson. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XVI. Minneapolis: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 1996, 392 pp.
  • Science without Laws. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999, 285 pp.   Read the Introduction.
  • Scientific Perspectivism. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006, 151 pp.   Read the Table of Contents and Chapter One.
ARTICLES:
  • Bayesian Statistics and Biased Procedures. Synthese 20(1969):371-87.
  • Orthodox Statistical Resolution of the Paradox of Confirmation, Philosophy of Science 37(1970):354-62.
  • Structure, Growth and Application of Scientific Knowledge: Reflections on Relevance and the Future of the Philosophy of Science. In Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 8. Ed. R. C. Buck and R. S. Cohen, 539-51. New York: Humanities Press, 1971.
  • Objective Single Case Probabilities and the Foundations of Statistics. In Logic, Methodology and Philosophy of Science, Vol. 4. Ed. P. Suppes, L. Henkin, A. Joja, and Cr. C. Moisil, 467-83. Amsterdam: North-Holland, 1973.
  • Epistemological Roots of Scientific Knowledge. In Induction, Probability, and Confirmation, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. VI. Ed. G. Maxwell and R. M. Anderson, Jr., 212-261. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1975.
  • Popper and the Non-Bayesian Tradition, Synthese 23(1975):119-132.
  • Empirical Probability, Objective Statistical Methods, and Scientific Inquiry. In Foundations of Probability Theory, Statistical Inference, and Statistical Theories of Science, Vol. 2. Ed. C. A. Hooker and W. Harper, 63-101. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1976.
  • Laplacean Formal Semantics for Single-Case Propensities, Journal of Philosophical Logic 5(1976):321-353.
  • Testing vs. Information Models of Statistical Inference. In Logic, Laws and Life, Pittsburgh Series in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 6. Ed. R. G. Colodny, 19-70. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1977.
  • Dilemma for Philosophers of Science and Technology. In PSA 1976, Vol. 2, Proceedings of the 1976 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Ed. F. Suppe and P. D. Asquith, 194-201. East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1977.
  • Birnbaum's Conception of Statistical Evidence, Synthese 25(1977):194-201.
  • Foundations of Probability and Statistical Inference. In Current Research in Philosophy of Science. Eds P. D. Asquith and H. E. Kyburg Jr., 503-33. East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1979.
  • Propensity and Necessity, Synthese 40(1979):439-51.
  • Causal Systems and Statistical Hypotheses. In Applications of Inductive Logic. Ed. L. J. Cohen and M. B. Hesse, 251-270. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1980.
  • Technological Decision Making. In Reason and Decision. Ed. M. Bradie and K. Sayre, 123-134. Bowling Green, Ohio: Philosophy Documentation Center, 1982.
  • Testing Theoretical Hypotheses. In Testing Scientific Theories, Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 10. Ed. J. Earman, 269-298. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1983. Causal Models with Frequency Dependence, The Journal of Philosophy, 81(1984):384-391.
  • Toward a Unified Theory of Science. In Science and Reality, Ed. J. T. Cushing, C. F. Delaney, and G. Gutting, 5-31. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.
  • Constructive Realism. In Images of Science. Ed. P. M. Churchland and C. A. Hooker, 75-98. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985.
  • Philosophy of Science Naturalized. Philosophy of Science 52(1985):331-356. Reprinted in Readings in the Philosophy of Science, 2nd ed. Ed. B. A. Brody and R. E. Grandy, 379-98. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1989.
  • Controversies Involving Science and Technology: A Theoretical Perspective. In Scientific Controversies: Case Studies in the Resolution and Closure of Disputes in Science and Technology, Ed. A. L. Caplan and H. T. Engelhardt, Jr., 125-150. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986.
  • Background Knowledge in Science: A Naturalistic Perspective. In PSA 1984, Vol. 2. Proceedings of the 1984 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, Ed. P. D. Asquith and P. Kitcher, 664-671. East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1986.
  • Cognitive Study of Science. In The Process of Science: Contemporary Philosophical Approaches to Understanding Science. Ed. N. Nersessian, 139-159. Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987.
  • Toward a Cognitive Theory of Science. In Scientific Inquiry In Philosophical Perspective, Ed. N. Rescher, 117-50. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1987.
  • Cognitive Models in the Philosophy of Science. In PSA 1986, Vol. 2, Proceedings of the 1986 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Ed. A. Fine and P. Machamer, 319-328. East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1988.
  • Theories, and Generalizations. In The Limitations of Deductivism. Ed. A. Grunbaum and W. C. Salmon, 37-46. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
  • Units of Analysis in Science Studies. In The Cognitive Turn: Sociological and Psychological Perspectives on Science. Sociology of the Sciences Yearbook, Vol. XIII. Ed. S. Fuller, M. DeMey, T. Shinn, and S. Woolgar, 3-11. Dordrecht: D. Reidel, 1989.
  • Scientific Rationality as Instrumental Rationality. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 20(1989):377-384.
  • Computer Discovery and Human Interests. Social Studies of Science 19(1989):638-643.
  • Evolutionary Models of Science. In Evolution, Cognition, and Realism, Ed. N. Rescher, 21-32. Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1990.
  • Knowledge, Values, and Technological Decisions: A Decision Theoretic Approach. In Acceptable Evidence: Science and Values in Hazard Management. Ed. D. G. Mayo and R. D. Hollander, 183-203. New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1991.
  • Implications of the Cognitive Sciences for the Philosophy of Science. In PSA 90, Vol. 2. Ed. A. Fine, M. Forbes, and L. Wessels, 419-430. East Lansing, MI: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1991.
  • Cognitive Construction of Scientific Knowledge. Social Studies of Science 22(1992):95-107.
  • Introduction: Cognitive Models of Science. In Cognitive Models of Science. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15. Ed. R. Giere, xiii-xxv. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
  • Science and Technology Studies: Prospects for an Enlightened Post-Modern Synthesis. Science, Technology, and Human Values, 18(1993):102-112.
  • Cognitive Structure of Scientific Theories. Philosophy of Science, 61(1994):276-96.
  • Viewing Science. In PSA 94, Vol. 2, Proceedings of the 1994 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association. Ed. R. Burian and M. Forbes, 3-16. East Lansing: The Philosophy of Science Association, 1995.
  • Science Without Laws of Nature. In Laws of Nature: Essays on the Philosophical, Scientific and Historical Dimensions. Ed. F. Weinert, 120-138. New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1995.
  • Visual Models and Scientific Judgment. In Picturing Knowledge: Historical and Philosophical Problems Concerning the Use of Art in Science. Ed. B. S. Baigrie, 269-302. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996.
  • Wissenschaftliche Philosophie to Philosophy of Science. In Origins of Logical Empiricism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XVI. Ed. R. Giere and A. Richardson, 335-354. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
  • Feminism Question in the Philosophy of Science. In Feminism, Science, and the Philosophy of Science. Ed. L. H. Nelson and J. Nelson, 3-15. Boston: Kluwer, 1996.
  • Explaining Scientific Revolutions. In Issues and Images in the Philosophy of Science. Ed. D. Ginev and R. S. Cohen, 63-86. Boston: Kluwer, 1997.
  • Scientific Inference: Two Points of View. Philosophy of Science, 64(1997):S180-84.
  • “Examinando la ciencia” (Explaining Science). In Filosofía Actual de la Ciencia, Suplemento 3, ed. Pascual F. Martínez-Freire, 15-36, 1998.
  • Using Models to Represent Reality. In Model-Based Reasoning in Scientific Discovery, Ed. L. Magnani, N. J. Nersessian, and P. Thagard, 41-57. New York: Kluwer/Plenum, 1999.
  • New Framework for Teaching Scientific Reasoning. Argumentation 15(1):21-33, 2001.
  • Critical Hypothetical Evolutionary Naturalism. In Selection Theory and Social Construction, ed. Cecilia Heyes and David L. Hull, 53-70, Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2001.
  • Scientific Cognition as Distributed Cognition. In Cognitive Bases of Science, eds. Peter Carruthers, Stephen Stitch and Michael Siegal, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.
  • Models as Parts of Distributed Cognitive Systems. In Model Based Reasoning: Science, Technology, Values, 227-41, eds. Lorenzo Magnani and Nancy Nersessian, Kluwer, 2002.
  • Distributed Cognition in Epistemic Cultures. Philosophy of Science (December 2002): 637-644.
  • The Role of Computation in Scientific Cognition. Journal of Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 15(2003, pp. 195-202.
  • Computation and Agency in Scientific Cognition. Proceedings of the 25th Annual Conference of the Cognitive Science Society, Boston, MA, July 31-August 2, 2003.
  • Distributed Cognition: Where the Cognitive and the Social Merge. (With Barton Moffatt.) Social Studies of Science 33 (April 2003), 301-310.
  • Perspectival Pluralism. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. XIX. Eds. Stephen H. Kellert, Helen E. Longino, C. Kenneth Waters, 26-41, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2006.
  • Modest Evolutionary Naturalism. Biological Theory, 1(1):52-60, 2006.
  • How Models are Used to Represent Reality. Philosophy of Science 71(5): 742-752, 2004.
  • The Problem of Agency in Scientific Distributed Cognitive Systems. Journal of Cognition and Culture 4 (3-4): 759-74, 2004.
  • Scientific Realism: Old and New Problems. Erkenntnis 63(2): 149-165, 2005.
  • What Everyone Should Know About STS. Essay review of John H. Zammito, A Nice Derangement of Epistemes. Post-positivism in the Study of Science from Quine to Latour. Social Studies of Science, 36(2006):489-493.
  • Distributed Cognition without Distributed Knowing. Social Epistemology Vol. 21, No. 3, July-September 2007, pp. 313-320.
  • Models, Metaphysics and Methodology. Forthcoming in Nancy Cartwright's Philosophy of Science, ed. S. Hartmann and L. Bovens. Routledge.
  • An Agent-Based Conception of Models and Scientific Representation. Synthese (forthcoming).
REVIEWS:
  • Significance Test Controversy (Essay review of D. E. Morrison and R. E. Henkel, eds. The Significance Test Controversy). British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 23(1972):170-81.
  • History and Philosophy of Science: Intimate Relationship or Marriage of Convenience? (Essay Review of R. Stuewer, ed. Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. V.) British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 24(1973):282-97.
  • Review of Rudolf Carnap and Richard C. Jeffrey, eds., Studies in Inductive Logic and Probability, Synthese 23(1975):187-199.
  • Interpreting the Philosophy of Science (Essay Review of Steve Fuller, Philosophy of Science and its Discontents). Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 22(1991):515-23.
  • Representation without Representation. (Essay Review of M. Lynch and S. Woolgar, eds. Representation in Scientific Practice). Biology and Philosophy 9(1994):113-120.
  • Review of Jeff Shrager and Pat Langley, eds., Computational Models of Scientific Discovery and Theory Formation. Minds and Machines, 4(1994):252-257.

SHORT REVIEWS, COMMENTS, LETTERS, ETC:
  • Structure of an Organism (letter), Science 162:140, 1968.
  • Review of Isaac Levi, Gambling with Truth. The Philosophical Review 78:113-16, 1969.
  • Comments on Braithwaite. In Science, Decision and Value, J. Leach, R. Butts and G. Pearce, eds. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1973, 62-66.
  • Comments on Churchman. In Science, Decision and Value, J. Leach, R. Butts and G. Pearce. eds. Dordrecht, Holland: Reidel, 1973, 95-97.
  • Review of D. H. Mellor, The Matter of Chance. Ratio 15:149-55, 1973.
  • Review of L. Laudan, Progress and Its Problems. The American Historical Review, 83, 83:688-689, 1978.
  • Review of R. D. Rosenkrantz, Inference, Method and Decision. Philosophy of Science 46:491-93, 1979.
  • Review of Thomas Nickles, ed., Scientific Discovery, Logic, and Rationality, Isis 72:255-56, 1981.
  • Review of Stephen E. Braude, ESP and Psychokinesis: A Philosophical Examination. The Philosophical Review, XCI, 2 (1982).
  • Understanding Understanding Scientific Reasoning. Teaching Philosophy 6:181-86, 1983.
  • Review of W. C. Salmon, Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. The Philosophical Review 97(1988):444-46.
  • What Does Explanatory Coherence Explain? Behavioral & Brain Sciences 12(1989):475-76,.
  • Bernal Prize Recipient: Dorothy Nelkin. Science, Technology, and Human Values 14(1989):302-304.
  • Syntax, Semantics, and Human Interests. Social Studies of Science 21(1991):150-153.
  • What the Cognitive Study of Science is Not. In Cognitive Models of Science. Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol. 15. Ed. R. Giere, 479-482. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1992.
  • The Scientist as Adult. Philosophy of Science, 63(1996):538-41.
  • Kuhn's Legacy for North American Philosophy of Science. Social Studies of Science. 27(1997):496-498.
  • Cognitive Approaches to Science. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, W. H. Newton-Smith, ed., 41-43. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
  • Naturalism. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Science ed. W. H. Newton-Smith, 308-10. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
  • Theories. In A Companion to the Philosophy of Science, ed. W. H. Newton-Smith, 515-24. Oxford: Blackwell, 2000.
  • Review of N. D. Cartwright, The dappled world: A study of the boundaries of science. Philosophy of Science, 67 (3), (2000):527-530.
  • Scientific Perspectivism. In Zukunft: Erfahrung, Erwartung, Entwur. Europaisches Forum Alpbach, 2000. Hg. E. Busek, 91-96. Iberia Verlag, Wien, 2001.
  • Naturalistic Philosophy of Science. In The Oxford Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, forthcoming.

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