"Blest be the man that spares these stones. And curst be he that moves my bones" -Wm. Shakespeare's epitaph PREFACE This paper is divided into two parts. Chapter One is a general survey and background discussion of theoretical developments in the discipline of archaeology in the twentieth century, and synthesizes the epistemological trends of culture-history, processualism and post-processualism. Chapter Two is a survey and discussion of developments in the sub-discipline of rock art studies and summarizes current theoretical trends. CHAPTER ONE DEVELOPMENTS IN ARCHAEOLOGICAL THEORY AS A WHOLE - EPISTEMOLOGY AND CULTURE- HISTORY, PROCESSUALISM, AND POST-PROCESSUALISM. Epistemology is concerned with how we know things. In archaeology there has been considerable discussion recently about epistemology and the need to consciously and deliberately explicate the assumptions underlying how we approach the study of material culture and how we reconstruct the past. This problem can be thought of as the problem of archaeological inference (Watson 1990). Can archaeologists accurately and safely infer past behavior and past beliefs and ideas from presently existing and possibly transformed objects? The history of how archaeology has been done in the twentieth century might be summarized into three broad approaches: description, explanation, and interpretation (Trigger 1989). These are now incorporated as primary phases in most contemporary archaeological excavation. The culture-history approach described and ordered artifacts in chronological sequences using stratigraphic excavation, stylistic seriation and eventually dendrochronology and radiocarbon dating. This descriptive approach dominated most of the Twentieth Century and produced as its final work product, charts and maps of cultures based upon artifacts, and cultural sequences and chronologies based upon excavation of stratigraphic layers. Although it certainly described change over time of artifacts and inferred cultures based upon changing artifact styles, its critics during the period of the New Archaeology, led by authors such as Lewis Binford (1962,1965,1968, 1972), argued that culture-history did little else. The New Archaeologists, who in a "toned down" form became the processualists, argued that meaning was rarely self-evident and the epistemology of the culture-history approach had simply assumed that history was all that we needed to know. The data and facts meant something historically and were viewed as fairly self-evident in meaning. The culture-historians were criticized by processualists because description alone was considered insufficient to explain the meaning of artifacts. The New Archaeologists argued that archaeologists could be easily misled and could not know and explain what facts meant unless they became "scientific" and used the deductive-nomological or hypothetico-deductive methods of hypothesis, testing, modification and retesting until finally an approximation of the truth was achieved. The philosophy and model underlying this approach was logical positivism derived from the Enlightenment thinkers who answered the question of "how we know what we know" by arguing that we can only really "know" something if we use the methodology of science. The New Archaeologists asked what all those facts excavated by the culture-historians meant. They argued that so-called facts do not exist apart from theory and to understand and explain facts, archaeologists must interpret facts in light of theories and abstractions. They were also interested in asking new questions about why there was change over time, what the forms of social organization were, and what the adaption to the environment was by these societies i.e. what was the environment like and how was food and the other necessities of human life obtained. The New Archaeologists wondered how we could know that we were not just making it all up - a concern taken up by the post-processualists like Hodder (1986), Shanks (1987) and Tilley (1982) that followed. The New Archaeologists thus began to look to science and positivism for the way to say something with relative certainty about the past. With the scientific model of epistemology underlying their efforts, they began to search for covering laws for past societies that would be analogous to the covering laws found in physics or chemistry. Unfortunately, as the post- processualists pointed out, the New Archaeologists have never been able to find a single covering law that was of any real importance. The post- processualists, led by Ian Hodder (1986, 1989), and drawing on the post-modern movement and literary theory, looked elsewhere to literary studies - for a new model or trope for archaeological epistemology. Post-processualism questioned the assumptions of unbiased observation underlying the epistemology of positivist science. Arguing that theory preceeded seeing or perception, contextualists maintained that "science" was an ideology that filtered perception. Positivist science was itself called into question. Rather than looking for covering laws, post-processualists argued in favor of the importance of historical particularism, and a recognition of the presence in the archaeological record of previously unstudied particular individuals and groups such as women and minority groups. The post-processualists argued that the meaning of artifacts was contextual, cultural, and cognitive or ideational. Artifacts were significant for more than simply the study of the adaption to an environment of a system that could be described in a flow chart. The interpretation of artifacts using a hermeneutic and contextual approach was argued for, and a perceived male bias in contemporary interpretions of past objects was criticized . Male archaeologists were argued to have privileged investigation of what they found interesting as males, overlooking the subjects and contributions of women and minorities to past societies and cultures. MARXISM, CULTURAL ECOLOGY, SYSTEMS THEORY, AND POST-PROCESSUALISM Although there were a wide variety of theoretical approaches to archaeology in the twentieth century, the foundational ideas are few and are arguably variants on Marxist ideas articulated in the nineteenth century. Karl Marx wrote that: In the social production which men carry on, they enter into definite relationships that are indispensable and independent of their will; these relations of production correspond to a definite stage of development of their material powers of production. The sum total of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society-the real foundation, on which rise legal and political superstructures and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production in material life determines the general character of the social, political, and spiritual processes of life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but, on the contrary, their social existence determines their consciousness ( Marx 1906). Material conditions influence the non-material. Unlike the later archaeological simplifications of his ideas, such as cultural ecology, Marx recognized that the relationship between technology, social organization, and ideology was a dynamic one and dialectic in nature. People in pre-industrial societies buffered themselves against starvation by organizing themselves in shifting social organizations that responded in better or worse ways to changes in the environment. In this manner the influence of Darwinian evolutionary thinking lies at the base of much Marxist thinking - including that of the Cultural Ecologists. The materialism of Marxism, of course, tends to focus on the economic and environmental realm as driving the social system which responds and adjusts to that environment. In the case of ideology, religion masks or "opiates" the economic realities of unequal distribution of resources and differential access to the means of production. Both Marxism and cultural ecology share a profound materialistic view of human beings as economically "rational" thus often missing the influence of the "irrational" and altered states of consciousness on the creation of ideology, the patterning of social organization, and superstructure. Religion may or may not be "the opiate of the masses," but "opiates" have arguably been at the heart of many religions that affected economic systems. Marx acknowledged that ideology and religion directly influence the economic base (Marx 1957). It has also been commonly observed that in times of economic stress, ritual and religious activity will increase. Recent studies of pre-industrial societies have indicated that most behavior is not focused on economic activity either in hunter-gatherer societies or even in some agricultural societies. The industrialized nation states of the nineteenth century and the often two income post-modern workstyles of the information age are perhaps another matter. Kent Flannery in "The Cultural Evolution of Civilizations" (1972: 399-400) has noted the disaffection with purely ecological approaches that did not produce the hoped for explanatory power when applied to complex societies. Flannery viewed this failure to have been caused by the cultural ecologists’ focus on studying "techno-environmental matters" and the exchange of matter and energy, thus leaving the exchange of information to the humanists. Flannery cited the dangers of this development in theory by using as an example a perversion of a ritual regulatory mechanism that caused an evolutionary change in a Mexican village in Oaxaca. He argued for the incorporation of the study of "information" back into the ecosystem model of archaeology. Elizabeth Brumfiel (1983) also suggested that ecological variables alone were insufficient to account for the formation of the Aztec state and a structural approach to the study of political dynamics or political ecology enhanced the understanding of how states emerge. The ecological approach of Julian Steward favoring population increase as the triggering mechanism for state formation was contrasted with that of Marx-Engels whose model "regards state formation as a process generated by particular sociocultural orders. Certain types of stratified societies for example, are said to possess an internal dynamic that exerts pressure for state formation even when the relationship between the human population and its environment is stable (Brumfiel 1983:261). Brumfiel felt that the "superior managerial capacity of state government" may have caused some states to form but that if states form in the absence of "a serious disparity between population and resources" then internal forces within the system should be investigated (Brumfiel 1983:262-3). In the case of the formation of the Aztec state warfare was "rooted in the internal political dynamics of the pre-state politics" and centralization of authority occurred because "new political options suddenly [were] opened by the evolving dynamics of political interaction" including "the intensification of civil war, invasion, and shifting alliances" (Brumfiel 1983:266,270). Brumfiel’s historically particular and politically detailed reconstruction of the formation of the Aztec state - full of human agency and historically specific political actors - ultimately seems more compelling and persuasive than the cultural-ecology hypothesis or Marx-Engels postulates or any of the state formation theories without similarly detailed supporting data. A contrary and explicitly Marxist approach and conclusion was exemplified by Berbeck (1995) who argued that archaeologists working on state formation in Mesopotamia focused too narrowly on political organization and overlooked economic data. She concluded that: "Mesopotamian societies in the 6th millenium B.C. can be shown to be politically ‘stable’ but economically changing" (Bernbeck 1995:1). She also pointed out that "change in the economic sphere need not necessarily be accompanied by change in the political sphere and vice versa" (Bernbeck 1995:1). Unlike Brumfiel’s study which was based partly upon ethnohistoric sources, Bernbeck unfortunately had only pottery, settlement patterns, building material, kilns and agricultural devices to work with. William Sanders (1962:34) has argued for an historically particular cultural ecological approach in the study of mesoamerica civilizations, defining cultural ecology as "the study of the interaction of cultural processes with the physical environment." The environment was "an active, integrated part of the cultural system not a passive extra-cultural factor" (Sanders 1962:35). Mesoamerica was, of course, a diverse environment and the relationships between "environment, agricultural technology, and socio-political systems" were subtle (Sanders 1962:41). Although he favors the view that the development of civilization was a corollary development to urbanization occurring first in the humid highlands with intensive agriculture, he did not think that archaeological materials could yet resolve the outstanding conflict with the opposing view that it developed in the humid lowlands based upon slash and burn agriculture (Sanders 1962:42-3). Interestingly, Karl W. Butzer (1980) postulated that civilizations behave as adaptive systems rather than organic entities i.e. with a life cycle of birth, growth, and death. In his view civilizations become unstable "when a top-heavy bureaucracy makes excessive demands on the productive sector [and] breakdowns result from chance concatenations of mutually reinforcing processes, not from senility or decadence" (Butzer 1980:517). Citing the unique and very particular history of ancient Egypt, with information presumably from the hieroglyphic written histories, he concluded that the important systemic variables included 1) "a progressive social pathology from a top-heavy and metastable sociopolitical pyramid," 2) leadership such as with the strong leadership of Ramses III [ramses3] (1182-1151 B.C), the first Ptolemies and the early Roman emperors, 3) foreign interventions, and 4) ecological stress from Nile behavior (Butzer 1980:5). Butzer illustrates a cultural ecology approach that cites environmental stress as only one of many factors that in combination could cause a process of decline. His emphasis on other political events and historical particularity seems sophisticated and scholarly and recognized the complexity of the situation. It is not clear, however, how much of his information came from excavation archaeology and how much came from written texts. Whether or not the degree of focus and detail that Butzer achieved can be reproduced in the absence historical records is not clear. SYSTEMS THEORY, PROCESSUALISM, AND POST-PROCESSUALISM Systems Theory, borrowing much from information theory (developed to apply to businesses and computers, but also living organisms), claimed like Marx, that there were three levels or subsystems of society: the ideological or religious, social organization, and technology (Flannery 1968, 1972). Each had a function and the structure of the network of relationships and feedback loops could be diagrammed with flow charts and arrows. The energy flow could be then observed and diagrammed in a metaphorical tribute to societies as computers or machines that break down when the parts are not synchronized. The amount of information that flowed (in these pre-Internet societies) was a standard for how complex the society was. Systems theorists saw specialized states arising due to a need for information management. In this view change occurred from inside the machine. It was thought that through settlement studies and studies of hierarchies and wealth, correspondences could be made to reconstruct the society. Instead of Durkheimian organic and mechanical metaphors of society, the business and computer metaphor was adopted. Post-processualists would find this computer and machine metaphor for human organization to be lacking in a recognition of human cognition, historical particularity, and the importance of agency and habitus or the style that gives people a dynamic "feel for the game" (Bourdieu 1977; Hodder 1986,1989). Feminist archaeologists would also point out that this approach led to a kind of archaeology where the people being described were without faces or genders, were not particular individuals, and the particular local history was de- emphasized (Tringham 1994, Conkey 1984). Cultural ecology, "a term devised by Julian Steward to account for the dynamic relationship between human society and its environment, and in which culture is viewed as the primary adaptive mechanism", simplified the Marxist model into the notion that base always determines superstructure or a kind of Marxism minus the dialectics (Renfrew and Bahn 1975). Where Marx had a recognized a dialectic process with ideology affecting economy, cultural ecologists saw a "one way conversation" where economy determined ideology. Perhaps the most extreme application of this view postulated that the Aztecs engaged in human sacrifice because of a "protein deficiency" rather than because of political, cosmological and religious ideology. With the theoretical shift towards looking more closely at societies’ relationship to the environment, Julian Steward (1955) and William Sanders (1962) methodologically began the more sophisticated settlement analysis that has come to be expected in contemporary North American archaeology. The postulation of a culture core, consisting of a constellation of subsistence and economic patterns that are the more basic features of a society, and the idea that social organization is secondary and an adaption is a kind of pared down version of the Marxist model (Marx 1906). Cultural ecologists thought that the more successful the society, the larger the population would become, and that with the introduction of agriculture, social change was due to the combined effects of population, economy and environment. Karl Butzer (1980) viewed social conditions as dynamic, and social organization as primarily an adaptive system. Economy was the most important factor and sets of ecological opportunities that arose over time drove the system. The echoes of Darwinian organic bodies adapting to changing environments was a clear metaphor. Social organizations, like organic species, had to change with fluctuating environmental stresses and conditions, or become extinct in a ecologically linked world. Ecological crises adjusted population (ala Malthus) and reorganized the religion, ideology, and politics. This postulated an external cause for societal change and focused on the study of cultural interactions with the environment. The changing environment created a bounded set of choices or opportunities within which a culture had to operate to provide food and shelter or die. The population increases brought about by surplus energy generated by the agricultural revolution also drove social change and the development of complex societies and new state organizations, which were initially thought to have been needed to organize irrigation of the fields and to redistribute resources in times of environmental stress. Processualists would incorporate this general viewpoint and continued to emphasize the importance of the processes involved with environmental and cultural change (Binford 1965). Later archaeologists would notice that a cultural ecology approach, where the economy for the most part determined everything else, resulted in the view that there was really no need to look at superstructure or ideology or religion because those were supposed to be in some sense "fictions" to mask the disparities of economic distribution. Why would archaeology need to study rock art or indigenous religious beliefs. Even Marx, from whence these materialist ideas originally came, indicated that things were not so one-sided (Marx 1957). The post-processualists pointed out that economics in social organizations may be directly affected by ideology and religion. The economic base is in dialogue with ideology. Eventually there was also open rebellion against Christopher Hawkes (1954) postulation of a "ladder of inference" that made ideology and religion the most difficult subject to know from working with material culture. Cognitive processual archaeologists, like Colin Renfrew (1982), rejected the idea that archaeologists working to discover cognitive, religious, and ideological patterns in prehistory were simply engaging in any more "speculation" than an environmental archaeologist. Processual archaeology, a complex development in materialism, with many theorists and advocates, argued for a new recognition of the taphonomic processes in archaeology. Behavioral archaeologists, like Michael Schiffer (1983, 1988), argued against the assumption that artifacts were in situ "fossils" of bygone cultures, and pointed out the many natural and cultural transformation processes that made the earlier culture-historical data collection approach and Binford’s early statement (that artifacts were "fossils" upon which past reconstructions could easily be made), look epistemologically simplistic. With the development of post-modernism, archaeological theorists like Hodder (1986) and Tilley (1982) turned to the Critical Theory of the Frankfurt School, hermenuetics, and the post-modern critique of logical positivism. In their view, theory directly influences what is perceived (i.e. "I wouldn’t have seen it if I hadn’t believed it"). They also argued that science is itself a western ideology that has tended to silence and exclude minorities and women. Post- processualists argued that today’s cultural setting directly affects our interpretation of the past i.e. we necessarily put ourselves in the past and see our mirrored image there. Adopting a relativist position, post-processualist s argued that archaeology can never really "know" an external objective "truth" that was the past. There are only our own perceptions today to work with. This suggests that objectivity is more difficult than what was assumed by the New Archaeologists. If archaeology is concluded to be a projection of ourselves onto the past, archaeology is never truly objective. According to post- processual archaeological theory, the same phenomenon of a multiplicity of meanings for objects, was also true of the makers of the material culture, who if they were here today to ask would give different contextual meanings or readings of the objects that they had made. Meaning would vary depending upon the person asked. Post-processualists argued that processualists had epistemologically assumed that simply by following a scientific methodology one could know something objective about the past in a relatively straight- forward manner. Post-processualists thus questioned the underlying assumptions about human perception that were being made by science itself. Human beings perceive and filter facts and data in an individual and culturally particular manner (Gibbon 1984). This recognition suggested the need for a cultural reassessment of archaeology itself, and led to the recognition by some of a kind of unreflexive ethnocentrism where "scientific" archaeologists tended to see what they wanted to see in the past, and necessarily turned the endeavor into a white male dominated one. Feminist archaeologists pointed to statements by men that about "Venus" figurines represented the cultural equivalent of Upper Paleolithic centerfolds. Feminist archaeologists looked at processualism and began asking the question: "Where are the women?" (Conkey 1984, Tringham 1994) Post-processual archaeology, as expounded by Hodder (1986: 156-60), did recognize the contributions of processual archaeology in encouraging the idea that culture is adaptive and for incorporating systems theory, information exchange theory and the importance of environmental theory. Hodder also processualism’s contribution to archaeological method in raising concerns about problems with inference, sampling, and research design. Hodder’s contextual archaeology incorporated a dialectic use of Marxism and structuralism and attempted the "breaking down of dichotomies, set up within archaeology, between individual and norm, structure and process, ideal and material," and "subject and object" (Id.). It was argued that Binford’s writings, however, did not describe a meaning- laden process and ignored the power of individuals to create change (Hodder 1986:157). The active social process of individuals improvising and creating culture was minimized. According to Hodder (1986; citing Greene 1987), in contextual methodology, "material culture can be interpreted as having different meanings to different groups at different times in the past" and the variability of text interpretations is linked to issues of power. People endlessly see things from different perspectives (Hodder 1986:160). Hodder saw structuralism with its "search for structures, codes of presences and absences, that lie behind historical and adaptive processes" as at odds with empiricism and positivism (Hodder 1986). He acknowledged that structure had different meanings to different structuralists, but argued that there is a reality behind measurable evidence, and for too long ideas, meaning structures, and ideology had been left out of the research by processual materialists who thought that archaeology could not carry out "palaeopsychology" (Hodder 1986:163) Instead of looking at the meaning content of symbols, material symbols were merely being seen "as indicators of contact, cultural affiliation and diffusion." In Hodder’s view meaning was contextual and not universal and archaeologists who used Native Americans only for the purpose of testing general statements ignored the concerns of the people themselves. Critical Theory had argued that the myth of the "apolitical" scientist was basically just another ideology of power from which people need to be liberated. Hodder was optimistic about recovering historically particular meanings from the archaeological record because he thought that historical meanings were real and produced real effects in the material world that were coherent, structured and systematic (Hodder 1986:164). Hodder also made explicit his agreement with earlier critiques of the assumptions of positivism by saying "it is false to separate theory and data, since the latter can only be perceived in relation to the former" (Hodder 1986:165). Post-processualism also showed a greater interest in the subjectivity of archaeologists and the effect of the social context of archaeologists on their interpretations of the past. With material culture being viewed as a material form of text, making use of linguistic codes, this "specific and concrete product, written to have effects in the world" could be interpreted for its historically particular meanings rather than simply being explained as evidence of trade contact, etc. Philosopher, Linda Patrick (1985) in asking "Is There an Archaeological record" suggested a possible synthesis of processualism’s concern to reconstruct and purify from distortion presently existing materials (and show the past natural conditions to which people in the past had to adapt), with post-processualism’s concern to interpret the meaning of past material symbols. "Structural or contextual archaeology draws inferences beyond those of new archaeology, moving from ‘material phenomena’ to ‘mental phenomena,’ analyzing artifacts and behavior in terms of culturally specific codes, and studying individuals’ symbolic and social strategies for living in groups and for tackling the environment in creative ways" (Patrick 1985:56). Patrick further suggested that the ubiquitous metaphor of an archaeological "record" - either a fossil record or a textual or historical record may not actually be accurate and a new trope may be needed that more accurately reflects what the epistemology of archaeological inference is actually about. Patrick also wrote an excellent summary of the major works in structuralism and semiotics since World War Two and their relationship and influence upon post-processual archaeology. This body of anthropological thought is in no small part what post-processualism has drawn from in formulating a model of archaeological evidence as a "body of material symbols" (Patrick 1985:40-44).
An anthropological subfield begun in the 1950’s that archaeologists have not incorporated into their thinking, (for reasons that are not clear to me) was the development in anthropology of a body of work on proxemics (the proximity at which human social interactions take place) and kinesics (the study of energy use and motion by people - particularly as they facilitate communication). Hall (1959, 1977) and Birdwhistell (1970) for example, provide several books that would seem to have obvious implications for how megaliths were designed, would have been phenomenologically experienced, and the ancient social distances and mental templates that people had for prehistoric public gatherings. CONCLUSION In choosing a preferred theoretical approach towards reconstructing the past, the original Marxist outlook that incorporated a dialectic between superstructure and base and that was historically particular and detailed still seems more persuasive than the early cultural ecology or systems theories. This is not to say that the cultural ecologists’ concern with the environment is not an important component of archaeology, but it is only one part of the picture. The cognitive archaeologists, post-processualists, and even the later cultural ecologists like Butzer, concluded that the ideational and religious realms were equally important and should not be overlooked in the attraction to the scientific methodology available for environmental reconstruction. Anthropological archaeology cannot leave out human agency, individual actors, ideology, religion and beliefs of the past. Patrick’s suggestion that archaeology may need a new metaphor to replace the idea that we are working with a "record" or "fossils" is interesting and bears further thought. She did not suggest a new metaphor for the field, but raised an intriguing question for the future. GO TO CHAPTER 2 "CURRENT TRENDS IN ROCK ART THEORY"GO TO CHAPTER 2 "CURRENT TRENDS IN ROCK ART THEORY"
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REFERENCES (Bernbeck 1962, Binford 1962, Binford 1965, Binford 1968, Binford 1972, Birdwhistell 1970, Bourdieu 1977, Brumfiel 1983, Butzer 1980, Conkey 1984, Flannery 1967, Flannery 1972, Flannery 1968, Gibbon 1984, Hall 1959, Hall 1977, Hawkes 1954, Hodder 1986, Hodder 1989a, Hodder 1989b, Leone 1982, Marx 1906, Marx 1957, Patrick 1985, Renfrew 1982, Sanders 1962, Schiffer 1983, Schiffer 1988, Shanks 1987, Steward 1955, Tilley 1982, Trigger 1989, Tringham 1991, Watson 1990) Bernbeck, R. 1962 Lasting Alliances and Emerging Competition: Economic Developments in Early Mesopotamia. American Anthropologis 64:33-44. Binford, L. 1962 Archaeology as Anthropology. American Antiquity 28:217-225. Binford, L. 1965 Archaeological systematics and the study of culture process. American Antiquity 31:203-210. Binford, L. 1968 Some comments on historical versus processual archaeology. Southwestern Journal of Anthropology 24:267-275. Binford, L. (editor) 1972 Archaeological perspectives. Seminar Press. Birdwhistell, R. L. 1970 Kinesics and Context: Essays on Body Motion Communication. University of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia. Bourdieu, P. 1977 Outline of a theory of practice. Translated by Richard Nice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Brumfiel, E. M. 1983 Aztec state making:ecology,structure, and the origin of the state. American Anthropologist 85:261-284. Butzer, K. W. 1980 Civilizations: Organisms or Systems? American Scientist :517-523. Conkey, M. a. J. S. (editor) 1984 Archaeology and the study of gender. 7. Academic Press. Flannery, K. 1967 Cultural history vs. culture process: A debate in American archaeology. Scientific American 217(2):119-122. Flannery, K. 1972 The cultural evolution of civilizations. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 3:399-426. Flannery, K. V. (editor) 1968 Archaeological systems theory and early mesoamerica. Anthropological Society of Washington, Washington. Gibbon, G. 1984 Anthropological Archaeology. Columbia University Press, New York. Hall, E. T. 1959 The Silent Language. Anchor Books, Garden City, New York. Hall, E. T. 1977 Beyond Culture. Anchor Books, Garden City, NewYork. Hawkes, C. F. 1954 Archaeological theory and method: some suggestions from the Old World. American Anthropologist 56:155-68. Hodder, I. 1986 Reading the Past. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Hodder, I. (editor) 1989a Post-modernism, post-structuralism,and post-processual archaeology. Unwin Hyman, London. Hodder, I. 1989b This is not an article about material culture as text. Journal of Anthropological Anthropology 8(3):250-269. Leone, M. 1982 Some opinions about recovering mind. American Antiquity 43:4-20. Marx, K. 1906 Capital: A Critique of Political Economy. The Modern Library, Random House, New York. Marx, K. a. F. E. 1957 On Religion. Progress Publishers, Moscow. Patrick, L. 1985 Is there an archaeological record? Advances in Archaeological Method and Theory 8:27-62. Renfrew, C. A. 1982 Towards an Archaeology of Mind (inaugural lecture). Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Sanders, W. 1962 Cultural ecology of Middle America. American Anthropologist 64:33-44. Schiffer, M. 1983 Towards the identification of formation processes. American Antiquity 48:675-706. Schiffer, M. 1988 The structure of archaeological theory. American Antiquity 53(3):461-485. Shanks, M. a. C. T. 1987 Re-Constructing Archaeology: Theory and Practice. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Steward, J. H. 1955 Theory of Culture Change. University of Illinois Press, Urbana. Tilley, C. (editor) 1982 Social formation, social structures and social change. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Trigger, B. G. 1989 A History of Archaeological Thought. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. Tringham, R. (editor) 1991 Houses without faces: the challenge of gender in prehistoric agricultural remains. Basil Blackwell. Watson, P. J. 1990 The razor's edge: symbolic-structuralist archaeology and the expansion of archaeological inference. American Anthropologist 92:613-629.
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